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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JANE WALTERS, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
vs. : 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, : Case No. 930272-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this domestic relations matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err by determining that unique or exceptional circumstances 
existed which warranted a reallocation of Defendant's pre-marital property? 
This question challenges the trial court's Findings of Fact. The applicable standard 
of review is a clearly erroneous standard. The appellate court may disturb the trial court's 
Findings of Fact if such findings are clearly erroneous. Hagan v. Hagan. 810 P.2d 478, 481 
1 
(Utah App. 1991); Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah App. 1991). The appellate court 
should also review the trial court's decision on the basis that it is clearly unjust and a clear abuse 
of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah App. 1988). 
II. Did the trial court err by not applying appropriate partnership dissolution rules 
when it reallocated the Defendant's pre-marital property after determining that the parties had a 
partnership relationship prior to the solemnization of their marriage? 
This question calls for a review of the trial court's Conclusions of Law. The 
appellate court should review the trial court's Conclusions of Law with no particular deference 
and should review such Conclusions of Law for correctness. Oats v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658 (Utah 
1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §48-1-15, §48-1-37, and §30-1-4.5 (1953 as amended) are the 
applicable statutes in this matter, copies of which are included in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter comes before the appellate court for the second time.1 The trial court 
originally ruled that the parties had a marriage-like relationship on or about January 1, 1980 (R. 
99, 103) (though the marriage was not solemnized until October 5, 1984) and distributed the 
property of the parties on the basis that they had a common law marriage pursuant to Utah Code 
!This matter has previously been appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, Case No. 890671-
CA; Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991). 
2 
Ann. §30-l-4.5.2 (R. 147). The Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court to properly 
categorize the parties property as marital or pre-marital based on the marriage date of October 
5, 1984. (R. 210). The court could then consider whether unique or exceptional circumstances 
existed meriting premarital property to be included in the marital estate. 
On remand, the trial court determined that "unique circumstances" existed allowing 
the court to exercise its discretion to reallocate premarital property. (R. 231). The court found 
"that from January 1980 until the time the parties were married, they commingled their earnings 
and efforts in such a way as to establish, for all intents and purposes, a partnership." (R. 232). 
On such basis, the trial court ruled that the Plaintiff was entitled to a reallocation of Defendant's 
premarital property. (R. 232). 
There are principally three parcels of real property which are at issue—Parcel 1, 
located in a trailer park at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah; Parcel 2, located in a trailer 
park at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah; and Parcel 3, located at 6072 West 9600 
North, Highland, Utah.3 
Parcel 1 was acquired by the Defendant in 1980 at a cost of $11,500. (Tr. 57). 
The Defendant also paid $2,165 for hookups for electricity and sewer (Tr. 57), and $700 for the 
2The trial court applied U.C.A. §30-4-4.5 retroactively. Section 30-4.4.5 was not adopted 
until 1987. 
3There is a fourth parcel of which the parties have stipulated that Defendant has no equitable 
interest in as he is listed as a legal owner only as an accommodation to his son to enable his son 
to acquire equitable interests in the property. 
3 
concrete pad. (Tr. 58). In addition, the Defendant hired a backhoe to put the water line and 
sewer line in. (Tr. 58). The Defendant participated with preparing and laying the concrete pad 
and the driveway. (Tr. 60). An addition to the driveway was paid for by the Defendant (Tr. 60), 
as was a retaining wall, two sheds, and a fence. (Tr. 61). 
In 1980, the Defendant permitted the Plaintiff to move her trailer on the pad 
located at Parcel 1 and live there rent free. (Tr. 28, 45, 56). At that time, the Plaintiff was being 
evicted from another trailer park. (Tr. 44). In addition to paying $521.00 for cost of moving the 
Plaintiffs trailer, the Defendant further assisted the Plaintiff by paying a number of debts and 
obligations of the Plaintiffs which included IRS-$4,000.00; State Tax Commission--$2,700.00; 
payment on Plaintiffs trailer~$3,000.00; payment on car loan-$400.00; payment on television 
loan~$ 150.00; and bills from a Wyoming accident~$ 1000.00. [Transcript and exhibit from 
original trial (Tr. 86-88, 105-106) (Ex. 13)] All of these expenses were paid prior to the 
marriage in 1984. The Defendant also spent $5,000.00 for the remodeling of the Plaintiffs trailer 
of which he performed much of the labor himself. (Tr. 67). These improvements included tearing 
out the living room and remodeling it, reinsulating, rewiring, putting up sheetrock, putting in new 
lighting, replacing the kitchen floor, building new cabinets, building a closet, and purchasing new 
windows. (Tr. 67). The Defendant also provided money to the Plaintiff when she was 
unemployed. (Tr. 39). 
In exchange for moving on Parcel 1 rent free, the Plaintiff agreed to coordinate 
all of the improvements needed, of which the Defendant would pay for. (Tr. 55, 56). With 
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regards to helping with improvements to Parcel 1, the Plaintiff helped coordinate the laying of 
concrete (Tr. 15, 21, 23, 26), laid sod, and planted flowers and trees. (Tr. 26). The Plaintiff 
helped assist with the numerous improvements to her trailer itself, both inside and outside. (Tr. 
14, 15, 35). These improvements were paid for by the Defendant. (Tr. 67). 
Parcel 2 was acquired in 1985 after the parties were married. The Defendant paid 
$10,500.00 for the property along with the associated hookup costs of $2,165.00. (Tr. 62). The 
Defendant's trailer was moved onto this property. At the time of the original trial, Parcel 2 had 
an encumbrance of approximately $5,000.00. (R. 238-239). The Defendant was held solely and 
individually liable for this debt. (R. 251). With regards to improvements to Parcel 2, all expenses 
were paid for by the Defendant. The Plaintiff helped coordinate the necessary cement work, and 
prepared the Defendant's trailer for rental. (Tr. 37). 
In 1977, the Defendant purchased Parcel 3 for $8,000.00. (Tr. 53). He made a 
final payment for Parcel 3 in the amount of $1,682.15 on May 23, 1981. (R. 239). The 
Defendant paid for substantial improvements to Parcel 3, including the construction of a 24'x 40' 
metal building, a sump tank, footings and a foundation wall, and concrete work. (Tr. 53, 54). 
The Plaintiff helped coordinate certain of these improvements such as arranging for the 
construction of the building, digging and laying of water pipes, back filling and leveling, and the 
laying of PVC Pipe and concrete. (Tr. 39). 
The trial court found that parcels 1 and 3 were the Defendant's premarital property, 
whereas each of the parties had a 50% interest in Parcel 2. (R. 239). The court then awarded 
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Parcel 1 to the Plaintiff and parcels 2 and 3 to the Defendant. (R. 250). The Defendant was 
further held solely and individually liable for the debt owing on Parcel 2. (R. 251). 
On April 21, 1993, the Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal from the decision 
rendered by Judge Ray M. Harding. (R. 254). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There were not unique or exceptional circumstances which warranted the trial court 
to reallocate the Defendant's pre-marital property. The facts and circumstances of which the trial 
court listed, though great in number, are not unique in nature, either singularly or collectively. 
A majority of the circumstances in which the trial court relied on deal with the parties pre-marital 
relationship and the findings are akin to recognizing once again a common law marriage before 
the common law marriage statute was enacted. 
The Plaintiff derived a great financial benefit from her pre-marital relationship with 
the Defendant. The Defendant paid off substantial debts for the Plaintiff and moved her trailer 
to his trailer pad where he permitted her to live rent free. With the financial and physical 
assistance from the Defendant, the Plaintiff obtained significant improvements to her trailer. 
Though the Plaintiff did help arrange for and make physical improvements to the Defendant's 
realty, such improvements were paid for by the Defendant. The efforts of the Plaintiff, on the 
other hand, were not a substantial contribution to the growth of the Defendant's realty. A close 
reading of the record shows those efforts consisted of mainly organizing her friends to do 
concrete work. This added no appreciable value to the property as shown by Plaintiffs appraisal. 
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The extensive costs expended on the Plaintiffs behalf prevented the Defendant from enhancing 
his properties. These properties were not accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the 
parties as the trial court found. The trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, and its decision 
is clearly unjust and a clear abuse of discretion. 
Rather than calling the parties pre-marital relationship a "marriage like 
relationship", the trial court found that from January 1980 until the time the parties were married, 
the nature of the parties' relationship, for all intents and purposes, was a partnership. The trial 
court, in its Memorandum Decision, determined that the Plaintiffs contributions of time and 
money to partnership endeavors entitled Plaintiff to a reallocation of Defendant's pre-marital 
property. (R. 232). The trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and amended decree, 
do not reflect a partnership distribution, and are thus inconsistent with the court's written 
Memorandum Decision. Furthermore, the trial court did not apply partnership distribution rules 
as required by Utah Code Ann. §§48-1-15 and 48-1-37. The trial court's Conclusions of Law 
should be reviewed for their correctness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WERE NOT UNIQUE OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
WHICH WARRANTED THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
PREMARITAL PROPERTY. 
The trial court acknowledged the general rule cited in Haumont v. Haumont 793 
P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) which states that typically, each party is to "retain the separate 
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property he or she brought into the marriage." At 424. (R. 231). It further noted that trial courts 
have the discretion to "reallocate premarital property" where "unique circumstances" exist. Id (R. 
231). The court then relied on facts and circumstances set forth in paragraph 10(a-l) of the 
original findings and conclusions signed October 5, 1989, and found such to be "unique" in 
nature. (R. 232).4 The Defendant submits that the facts and circumstances in paragraph 10(a-l) 
are not unique in nature, either singularly or collectively. Furthermore, by relying on such 
circumstances as "unique" in nature, is akin to once again recognizing a "marriage like 
relationship" prior in time to when Utah's common law marriage statute was enacted. Utah Code 
Ann. §30-1-4.5 (1987). 
Looking closely at paragraph 10(a-l) of the findings and conclusions signed 
October 5, 1989 (R. 150-152), and paragraph 3(A-L) of the findings and conclusions signed 
March 23, 1993 (R. 235-237), the facts and circumstances are not "unique" in nature. 
Each subparagraph is not unique in nature unless perhaps one is trying to establish 
that there was a "marriage like relationship". For instance, the first subparagraph states that "The 
parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4 December, 1978". (R. 150, 235). This surely is not 
unique in nature. 
The second subparagraph points out that the Plaintiff resided in her mobile home 
in Orem, Utah, and when the Defendant was not working out of state on temporary duty 
Paragraph 10(a-l) were reincorporated into the trial courts last Findings and Conclusions as 
Paragraph 3(A-L). (R. 235-237). 
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assignments, he would stay with the Plaintiff in her mobile home. (R. 150, 235). Again, this is 
not unique in nature. 
Likewise, in all twelve subparagraphs of these findings, none are unique in nature, 
either singularly or collectively, which would warrant the distribution of the Defendant's pre-
marital property. These subparagraphs only evidence that the parties had a pre-marital 
relationship and that the Plaintiff derived great benefit from such relationship at the financial 
sacrifice of the Defendant. Of these findings, only subparagraph "e/E" remotely represents 
circumstances that would permit the Plaintiff to have a share of the Defendant's pre-marital 
property. (This will be further addressed below concerning the Plaintiffs contribution toward 
the growth of the Defendant's separate assets.) In summary, by recognizing the aforementioned 
subparagraphs as "unique" in nature, would, in essence, be once again recognizing a "marriage 
like relationship" before Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 was enacted in 1987. As this court has 
already ruled, §30-4-4.5 may not be applied retroactively. Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 69 
(Utah App. 1991). 
As instructed by the Court of Appeals, the trial court points out that it considered 
the factors suggested in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) for determining unique 
circumstances. As Burke points out, the factors that are generally considered are: 
the amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the 
property was acquired before or during the marriage; the source of 
the property; the health of the parties; the parties' standard of 
living, respective financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity; 
the duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage; the 
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parties' ages at time of marriage and of divorce; what the parties 
gave up by the marriage; and the necessary relationship the 
property division has with the amount of alimony and child support 
to be awarded. Of particular concern . . . is whether one spouse 
has made any contribution toward the growth of the separate assets 
of the other spouse and whether the assets were accumulated or 
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties, (emphasis added). 
Id. at 135; Walters, 812 P.2d at 67. After considering such factors, a trial court may reallocate 
premarital property if unique circumstances exist. Id; Haumont 793 P.2d at 424-25. 
The trial court states that it gave special attention to the factor most emphasized 
in Burke: "Of particular concern . . . is whether one spouse has made any contribution toward 
the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether the assets were accumulated 
or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties." At 135. (R. 232). The trial court concluded that 
the Plaintiff made a substantial contribution to the growth of the Defendant's separate assets. 
The Defendant asserts that the efforts of the Plaintiff were not a substantial 
contribution to the growth of the Defendant's realty. A close reading of the record indicates that 
those efforts primarily consisted of organizing her friends to do concrete work. (Tr. 15, 16, 17, 
19, 23, 26, 33, 37, 38, 55, 56). She also planted some sod and flowers on parcel 1. (Tr. 26). 
This added no appreciable value to the property awarded to her as shown by the Plaintiffs 
appraiser. (R. 243, 244). The Plaintiffs appraisal valued Parcel's 1 and 2 at the same value, each 
at $20,000.00. The Plaintiffs appraisal does not reflect an appreciable value for the 
improvements on Parcel 1 of which the Plaintiff was involved. 
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All of the improvements which were made on the properties were paid for by the 
Defendant. (Tr. 49). In addition to paying off the payments on the Plaintiffs trailer home 
totaling $3,500.00 (Tr. 67), the Defendant spent over $5,000.00 for improvements to the 
Plaintiffs trailer (Tr. 67), all to the benefit of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff derived further financial 
benefit from the Defendant as he moved her trailer, at a cost of $521, to his pad located on 
Parcel 1 where she was permitted to live rent free. The Defendant further assisted the Plaintiff 
by paying off her debts and obligations which included $4,000.00 to the IRS, $2,700.00 to the 
State Tax Commission, $400.00 for a car loan, $150.00 for a television loan, and bills from a 
Wyoming accident totaling $1,000.00. [transcript and exhibit from original trial (Tr. 86-88, 105-
106) (Ex. 13)]. All of these expenses were paid prior to the parties marriage in 1984. The 
Defendant also paid substantial amounts of money to the Plaintiff for services rendered and to 
keep her going at home. (Tr. 67, 68). 
The trial court is mistaken by finding that the Plaintiff was a financial contributor 
to the relationship which allowed the Defendant the ability to pool his resources and use them 
for the purchase of his properties. (R. 240). It is quite evident that the Plaintiffs financial 
assistance did not enhance the Defendant. He could have and would have paid for the 
improvements and properties with or without her. (Tr. 64). He was of great assistance to her at 
his expense. Without the considerable payments on the Plaintiffs behalf, the Defendant would 
have better been able to dedicate his resources to accumulating and enhancing his properties. 
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It is evident that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. The record is clear 
that there are not unique circumstances which warrant the reallocation of the Defendant's pre-
marital property. The trial court's decision is clearly unjust and a clear abuse of discretion. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT APPLY APPROPRIATE PARTNERSHIP 
DISSOLUTION RULES WHEN IT REALLOCATED THE DEFENDANT'S 
PRE-MARITAL PROPERTY AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE 
PARTIES HAD A PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO THE 
SOLEMNIZATION OF THEIR MARRIAGE. 
It is evident that the trial court struggled with the prospect of not being able to 
treat the parties' pre-marital relationship as a "marriage like relationship". The court overcame 
this by determining that the relationship, for all intents and purposes, was a partnership, as stated 
in the court's Memorandum Decision. (R. 232). However, the court's determination that there 
was a partnership, was not incorporated in the court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
amended decree, and thus they are inconsistent with the court's Memorandum Decision. By 
recognizing a partnership, the trial court should have applied the appropriate partnership 
dissolution rules when reallocating the Defendant's pre-marital property. These rules were not 
used, resulting in the pre-marital property being distributed in an inequitable manner. 
The applicable partnership dissolution rules require that each partner should be 
repaid their respective contributions and that the liabilities should be paid proportionately. Utah 
Code Ann. §§48-1-15, 48-1-37 (1953 as amended). Section 48-1-15(1) states that "Each partner 
shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of capital or advances to the partnership 
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property . . . and must contribute towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained 
by the partnership according to his share in the profits." Id Section 48-1-37(4) further states that 
"The partners shall contribute as provided by Subsection 48-1-15(1) the amount necessary to 
satisfy the liabilities . . . " . Id 
To properly apply these rules, the trial court should have determined the respective 
contributions of the parties and then distributed the properties accordingly. The court's allocation 
of the properties were inequitably divided as the Defendant was not properly credited for his 
significant contributions. The Plaintiff, however, was credited for contributions which were 
insignificant in nature or that applied solely to the betterment of her own personal property. 
Because the trial court failed to properly apply the partnership dissolution rules, 
a manifest injustice occurred, and the court's conclusions of Law should be reviewed for their 
correctness. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred by determining that there were "unique" circumstances which 
warranted the allocation of Defendant's pre-marital property. The Plaintiffs contributions of time 
and money did not significantly enhance the pre-martial properties accumulated by the Defendant. 
The Defendant's contributions to the Plaintiff on the other hand were significant in nature, which 
inhibited the Defendant from accumulating and improving his properties. The trial court's 
findings are clearly erroneous and the court's decision is clearly unjust and a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
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The trial court concluded that the parties relationship was, for all intents and 
purposes, a partnership. The trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and amended 
decree, however, do not reflect a partnership distribution, and are thus inconsistent with the 
court's written Memorandum Decision. To apply proper partnership dissolution rules, the trial 
court should have determined the respective contributions of the parties and then distributed the 
properties accordingly. It is important that the trial court's conclusions of Law should be 
reviewed for their correctness. 
The Defendant asks that the Court of Appeals remand this case to the Fourth 
Judicial District Court to enable it to properly distribute the pre-marital property with instructions 
that there were not unique circumstances warranting the allocation of the Defendant's pre-marital 
property. If a redistribution is merited, the applicable partnership dissolution rules should be 
applied distributing the properties according to the respective contributions of the parties. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 1993. 
iLhurt 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
TAYLOR, MOODY &lTHORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of August, 1993, I did mail two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing to Dana D. Burrows, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, 387 West 
Center, Orem, Utah 84057; postage prepaid. 
jm2 miscella\app-walters 
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ADDENDUM 
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CK b I i 3: ... '32 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 8724 0 8 
vs . 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court after defendant's appeal 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. The appellate court has remanded 
for this court's further consideration of the division of the 
parties' property. Consistent with the appellate court's 
decision, this court amends its prior ruling and finds that the 
parties' marriage began upon solemnization on October 5, 1984. 
Accordingly, parcels of real estate purchased by defendant prior 
to that date are deemed pre-marital property. 
This Court acknowledges the general rule cited in Haumont v. 
Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) that each party is 
typically to "retain the separate property he or she brought into 
the marriage." However, as the Court of Appeals properly noted, 
trial courts have the discretion to "reallocate premarital 
property" where "unique circumstances" exist. Id. This Court 
finds that unique circumstances exist in this case which warrant 
a reallocation of defendant's premarital property so as to grant 
the parcel upon which plaintiff's trailer is situated to the 
plaintiff as was awarded in this court's original Amended Decree 
of Divorce. 
Such unique circumstances include those set forth in 
paragraph 10(a-l) of the Court's Findings and Conclusions signed 
October 5, 1989. In summary, the Court finds that from January 
1980 until the time the parties were married, they commingled 
their earnings and efforts in such a way as to establish, for all 
intents and purposes, a partnership. The nature of the parties' 
relationship and plaintiff's contributions of time and money to 
partnership endeavors entitles plaintiff to a reallocation of 
defendant's "premarital property" in the manner described in the 
Court's Amended Decree. 
After full consideration of the factors suggested in Burke 
v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), the Court finds that 
unique circumstances exist in this case. This Court has given 
special attention to the factor most emphasized by the Supreme 
Court: "Of particular concern . . . is whether one spouse has 
made any contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of 
the other spouse and whether the assets were accumulated or 
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties." Id. Plaintiff in 
this case clearly made a substantial contribution to the growth 
of defendant's separate assets. As the Court noted in its 
Findings and Conclusions, plaintiff helped arrange for and make 
considerable improvements to defendant's realty on which her 
mobile home was placed and to another parcel that defendant was 
purchasing at the time. Further, because defendant's realty at 
issue was acquired and improved during the time in which the 
parties were commingling their earnings and efforts, the Court 
finds that such assets "were accumulated or enhanced by the joint 
efforts of the parties." Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to 
an equitable share of such assets, i.e., she is entitled to the 
parcel on which her mobile home was placed. 
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an order within 15 days 
of this decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and 
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to 
submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision 
has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 18th day of December, 1992. 
cc: Dana D. Burrows, Esq. 
Robert L. Moody, Esq. 
DANA D. BURROWS - 5405 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
387 West Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, : Civil No. CV 87 2408 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 23rd day of 
September, 1992, pursuant to those issues that were remanded by the 
Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court has remanded for this 
Court's further consideration the division of the parties1 
property. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented by her 
attorney of record, Dana D. Burrows. Defendant also appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L. 
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did other witnesses. The 
parties each introduced several exhibits and stated their 
stipulations into the record. Being thereby and otherwise fully 
apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and filings regarding 
this matter, this Court, having taken the matter under advisement 
and having issued its Memorandum Decision, now hereby enters the 
following: 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Consistent with the Appellate Court's decision, this 
Court amends its prior ruling and;finds that the parties' marriage 
began upon solemnization on October 5, 1984. Accordingly, parcels 
of real property purchased by Defendant prior to that date are 
deemed premarital property. 
2. This Court acknowledges the general rule cited in Haumont 
v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,242 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) that each party 
is typically to "retain the separate property he or she brought 
into the marriage." However asl the Court of Appeals properly 
noted, trial courts have the discretion to "reallocate premarital 
property" where "unique circumstances" exist. Id. This Court finds 
that unique circumstances exist in this case which warrant a 
reallocation of Defendant's premarital property so as to grant the 
parcel upon which Plaintiff's trailer is situated to the Plaintiff 
as was awarded in this Court's original Amended Decree of Divorce. 
3. Such unique circumstances include those set forth below: 
A. The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4 
December, 1978. 
B. At the time they met, Plaintiff resided in her 
mobile home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 1200 
West, Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes 
required temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided 
missile sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when 
not on TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her 
mobile home. 
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C. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own 
name, a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At 
that same time the parties moved plaintiff's mobile home onto that 
pad where they continued to cohabit. Defendant paid for the costs 
of moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as 
the costs incurred for culinary wjater and sewer connections. 
D. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the 
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the 
realty as her residence. 
E. At various times when Defendant was on TDY 
assignments, Plaintiff helped arrange for and make physical 
improvements to the Defendants realty on which her mobile home was 
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and 
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such 
improvements included the laying of concrete pads at each location, 
leveling, laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction 
of outbuildings and a metal building. 
F. While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings 
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living 
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the 
realty. 
G. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant 
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain 
Plaintiff and her daughter. 
H. Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's 
separate debts owed to the I.R.S.., the Utah State Tax Commission, 
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an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase 
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile 
accident. 
I. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor 
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and 
permission, and prior to solemnisation of the marriage, attended 
school under Defendant's family name of Walters. 
J. Defendant listed his address on his federal and 
state income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, 
Utah—the same as Plaintiff's residence—for each of the years 
1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983. 
K. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in 
his federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent 
children who lived with you11 for each of the years 1982, 1983, and 
1984. 
L. The evidence does not indicate that the parties' 
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage. 
4. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter 
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at 
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove|, Utah, continuously since on or 
about May 1980. Plaintiff's daugjhter has attended the elementary 
and secondary schools servicing that address for her entire 
education and has been and is a {member of the local ward of the 
church also servicing that address. Prior to May 1980, Plaintiff 
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was 
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home 
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has been the minor's only home. 
5. Defendant has been emplqyed as a civilian employee of the 
federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial. 
6. During the parties1 marriage, Plaintiff has been an 
employee of United Stated Steel Corporation except for a period 
when her employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was 
the location where she was employed. At the time of the original 
trial, Plaintiff had been re-empJoyed by Geneva Steel for a period 
of approximately one year. 
7. As of the date of the original trial Defendant was the 
record owner of four parcels of realtv, to wit: 
A. Parcel 1— 
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located Plaintiff's aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72-foot 
Concord. 
B. Parcel 2 — 
640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located a 1975 70-foot Brighton mobile home. 
C. Parcel 3— 
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
D. Parcel 4 — 
746 West 600 North], Or em, Utah. 
8. Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 
2 was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to 
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract for the purchase of Parcel 3 in July 1977, reciting 
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a down payment of $2,200.00 with apiual payments toward the balance 
of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to commence in 
June 1978. Defendant made a final payment for Parcel 3 in the 
amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May 1981. The parties have stipulated 
that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem parcel and 
that he is listed as legal owner of Parcel 4 only as an 
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable 
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by 
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a 
balance as of the date of the original trial in the amount of 
approximately $5,000.00. 
9. The Walters1 marriage began on October 5, 1984, and as 
such all marital property acquired prior to that time is premarital 
property of Defendant. Specifically, Parcels 1, 3 and 4 are 
premarital property of Defendant, whereas each of the parties has 
a 50% interest in Parcel 2. 
10. The Court now considers the following exceptional 
circumstances in effectuating an equitable distribution of the 
marital and premarital property: whether one spouse has made any 
contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of the other 
spouse and whether the assets were accumulated or enhanced by the 
joint efforts of the parties; amount and kind of property to be 
divided; whether the property was acquired before or during the 
marriage; source of the property; health of the parties; the 
parties1 standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs 
and earning capacity; the duration of the marriage; the children of 
6 
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the marriage; the parties1 ages at time of marriage and of divorce; 
what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary 
relationship that property division has with the amount of alimony 
and child support to be awarded* 
11. The court finds that based upon the exceptional 
circumstances set forth in paragraph 10 above, that Parcels 1, 3 
and 4 were acquired prior to the actual marriage but during the 
time period that the parties were actually cohabiting as applied to 
Parcels 1 and 3. It appears that Parcel 4 was purchased prior to 
the time that the parties were cohabiting but that payments were 
made subsequent to cohabitation. 
12. Plaintiff in this ca?e clearly made a substantial 
contribution to the growth of Defendant's separate assets. As the 
Court noted in its Findings and Conclusions, Plaintiff helped 
arrange for and make considerable improvements to Defendant's 
realty on which her mobile home was placed and to another parcel 
the Defendant was purchasing at the time. Further, because 
Defendant's realty at issue was acquired and improved during the 
time in which the parties were commingling their earnings and 
efforts, the Court finds that such assets "were accumulated or 
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties." 
13. The source of the property was that of the purchase by 
Defendant in each of the cases of the premarital properties. 
However, Plaintiff was also a financial contributor to the 
relationship which allowed Defendant the ability to pool his 
resources and use for the purchase of said properties. Were it not 
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for Plaintiff's help however, Defendant would have needed to use 
his resources in other manners and would not have been able to 
purchase said properties, 
14- The court finds that each of the parties are in good 
health- The parties each have; standards of living that are 
reasonably consistent with that prior to entry into the marriage. 
However, Plaintiff was not employed for a period of time at the 
request of Defendant which has injured the Plaintiff as it relates 
to retirement and the opportunity to purchase items on her own 
while the parties were living together but prior to their marriage 
which occurred over a period of four to five years. 
15. The parties were married for approximately three years 
prior to separation and lived together for a period of seven years 
total. The duration of the marriage was approximately five years 
and there are no children of this marriage, though Plaintiff has a 
child from a prior marriage who is presently age 16. 
16. Defendant has no child support or alimony obligation to 
the Plaintiff and as such the property division is critical because 
it is the main asset that remains to be divided. 
17. The court finds that Plaintiff has made substantial 
contributions toward the purchase and growth of the separate assets 
of Defendant, in particular Parcels 1, 3 and 4 and as such the 
value of the properties has been enhanced by the efforts of 
Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff during the parties1 
relationship prior to the marriage was gainfully employed and spent 
a substantial portion of her income to provide food and clothing 
8 
241 
for the parties as well as purchase of a transmission for 
Defendant's vehicle• Plaintiff also purchased a majority of the 
tools that were used to improve the properties which had a cost to 
the Plaintiff of approximately $500. Plaintiff also engaged in 
physical labor on the properties such as laying the PVC pipe and 
wire mesh and rebar for the cement slabs. Plaintiff also acted as 
a hod carrier in the brick work that was performed as well as 
sheetrocking, taping, sanding and painting the structures. The 
Plaintiff also cleaned and painted the trailer that is awarded to 
Defendant and leveled the ground where it is presently located. 
Plaintiff also supported Defendant by working in the parties' 
residence while they cohabited ana performed domestic labors that 
benefitted Defendant as well. Plaintiff was willing to be engaged 
in employment outside of the home but didn't do so at the request 
of Defendant. 
18. Defendant previously testified at the original trial on 
February 7, 1989, as to the purchase prices and costs of 
improvements dedicated to parcels, 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to 
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of 
trial. The parties previously stipulated to this court's 
acceptance into evidence of written appraisals of the parcels 
offered by Plaintiff and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a 
Certified Review Appraiser. This court considered Mr. Lamoreaux's 
assessment of the valuation of the parcels more credible than 
Defendant's own assessment for the following reasons: 
A. Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively 
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on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to 
each parcel. 
Mr. Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several 
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and 
shopping, existence or nonexistence of public improvements, adverse 
easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout, insulation, 
adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and marketability, 
remaining economic life, availability for expansion, comparisons to 
recent sale of similar and proximate properties, income potential, 
highest and best use, and replacement cost. 
B. Defendant testified to having no significant 
training or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar 
properties. 
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his 
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate 
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he 
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to 
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general 
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he 
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor, 
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review 
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association. 
Upon the foregoing, this court accepts and adopts the 
valuations placed ont he properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit: 
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
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Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
Parcel 3, with improvements: $10,000.00 
19. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance 
affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and 
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their 
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for 
which either party is liable either jointly or individually. 
20. Defendant now submits additional appraisals stating the 
values of Parcel 1 as $24,675.00 and Parcel 2 as $17,500.00. 
21. The court finds that the appraisals by Mr. Lamoreaux have 
previously been adopted by the court and that the issue of 
valuation of the properties is not in dispute and was not reversed 
by the Court of Appeals. As such, the court will not consider the 
values set forth in the appraisals by Defendantf s most recent 
appraiser, but will rather affirm the values as established by Mr. 
Lamoreaux. 
22. Each party is entitled to one-half of the other parties1 
retirement that accrued from the commencement of the ceremonial 
marriage until entry of the Decree of Divorce. Each party shall 
cooperate and provide the appropriate information to the other 
party so that Qualified Domestic Relations Orders can be 
implemented to that affect. 
23. Each party should be responsible for their own attorney's 
fees and court costs incurred in pursuing the issues remanded by 
the Court of Appeals. 
24. The parties have stipulated and the judgment for 
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Plaintiff against Defendant for her equitable share of the parties 
savings in the sum of $3,150 remains in full force and effect, plus 
any accruing interest. This judgment represents $400 from 
Defendant's Deseret Bank account and $2,750 from Defendant's 
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the 
remainder of each account. 
25. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable 
for all debt encumbering, associated with or owing for the realty, 
improvements and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties' equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right, title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements—including the mobile home— 
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant 
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff. 
Defendant should retain all right, title and interests in and to 
the parties1 realty and improvements—including the mobile home— 
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty 
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
Such division is equitable considering the exceptional 
circumstances which are considered during the time that the parties 
lived together prior to their marriage as well as owing to the time 
periods during which such equities were acquired in relation to the 
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marital relationship that existed between the parties after 
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective 
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties 
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the 
long-established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as 
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to 
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of 
the monetary values of the properties, owing to the fact that 
Plaintiff was a major contributor as to the labor performed and 
arranged which improved the properties, owing to the fact that 
Plaintiff was employed and provided other necessities for Defendant 
I 
which freed up Defendant's incom^ to make the actual payments on 
the properties prior to the parties1 marriage, owing to the age of 
the parties and the duration of the marriage and the fact that 
Plaintiff gave up substantial earning capacity at the request of 
Defendant, owing to the fact that Defendant has no alimony or child 
support obligation to the Plaintiff and that the real property is 
the only remaining assets to be divided and owing to the fact that 
Plaintifff s contributions toward the growth of Defendantf s separate 
property vastly enhanced the value of said properties. 
2. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable 
for all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty, 
improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
3. Each party is awarded a one-half interest in the other 
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party's retirement that accumulated from the date of the parties' 
ceremonial marriage until entry of the Decree of Divorce. Both 
parties shall cooperate and provide the necessary information to 
the other parties so that Qualified Domestic Relations Orders may 
be implemented. 
4. Each party is responsible for their own attorney's fees 
and court costs incurred in pursuing the issues remanded by the 
Court of Appeals. 
5. The parties have stipulated and the judgment for 
Plaintiff against Defendant for her equitable share of the parties 
savings in the sum of $3,150 remains in full force and effect, plus 
any accruing interest. This judgment represents $400 from 
Defendant's Deseret Bank account and $2,750 from Defendant's 
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the 
remainder of each account. 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
DATED t h i s J%3 day o f J4a rp t tT^93 . 
J
 r;<5TavuVsS 
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4-504 MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the-foregoing 
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this S day of 
March, 1993. 
Robert L. Moody 
2525 North Canyon Rd. 
Provo, UT 84604 
DANA D. BURROWS 
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DANA D. BURROWS - 5405 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
387 West Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, : ORDER AMENDING DECREE OF 
DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, : Civil No. CV 87 2408 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 23rd day of 
September, 1992, pursuant to those issues that were remanded by the 
Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court has remanded for this 
Court's further consideration the division of the parties1 
property. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented by her 
attorney of record, Dana D. Burrows. Defendant also appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L. 
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did other witnesses. The 
parties each introduced several exhibits and stated their 
stipulations into the record. Being thereby and otherwise fully 
apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and filings regarding 
this matter, this Court, having taken the matter under advisement 
and having issued its Memorandum Decision, and having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters the following 
Order Amending the Decree of Divorce: 
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1. A Decree of Divorce in the above-entitled matter was 
entered on October 5, 1989. 
2. The Defendant having appealed several of the issues to 
the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals having rendered a 
ruling and having remanded to this Court for further consideration 
of the division of personal property: 
A. Plaintiff shall be awarded as her equitable share of 
the parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right, title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements—including the mobile home— 
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant is 
ordered to deed and deliver such [realty to Plaintiff. 
B. Defendant shall retain all right, title and 
interests in and to the parties1 realty and improvements—including 
the mobile home—situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, 
Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 
North, Highland, Utah. 
C. Such division is equitable considering the 
exceptional circumstances which are considered during the time that 
the parties lived together prior to their marriage as well as owing 
to the time periods during which such equities were acquired in 
relation to the marital relationship that existed between the 
parties after solemnization of their marriage, owing to the 
respective contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the 
properties by each party, owing to the fact that such division 
preserves the long-established residence of Plaintiff and her minor 
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daughter as well as the minor's school and religious associations, 
and owing to the fact that such division approximates a near equal 
division of the monetary values of the properties, owing to the 
fact that Plaintiff was a major contributor as to the labor 
performed and arranged which improved the properties, owing to the 
fact that Plaintiff was employed and provided other necessities for 
Defendant which freed up Defendant's income to make the actual 
payments on the properties prior to the parties' marriage, owing to 
the age of the parties and the duration of the marriage and the 
fact that Plaintiff gave up substantial earning capacity at the 
request of Defendant, owing to the fact that Defendant has no 
alimony or child support obligation to the Plaintiff and that the 
real property is the only remaining assets to be divided and owing 
to the fact that Plaintiff's contributions toward the growth of 
Defendant's separate property vastly enhanced the value of said 
properties. 
3. Defendant shall be held solely and individually liable 
for all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty, 
improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, Defendant shall hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
4. Each party is awarded a one-half interest in the other 
party's retirement that accumulated from the date of the parties' 
ceremonial marriage until entry of the Decree of Divorce. Both 
parties shall cooperate and provide the necessary information to 
the other parties so that Qualified Domestic Relations Orders may 
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be implemented. 
5. Each party is responsible for their own attorney's fees 
and court costs incurred in pursuing the issues remanded by the 
Court of Appeals. 
6, The parties have stipulated and the judgment for 
Plaintiff against Defendant for her equitable share of the parties 
savings in the sum of $3,150 remains in full force and effect. 
This judgment represents $400 from Defendant!s Deseret Bank account 
and $2,750 from Defendant's America First Thrift account. 
Defendant should be awarded the remainder of each account. 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
DATED this J23 day of 1993, 
Y^ M. HARDING <jT/f ' / ^ < ^ \ \ ! 
4-504 MAILING CERTIFICATE w ~ ^ — 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e and c o r r e c t co]Ay QJL the^oregc&ncj 
was mai led t o t h e fo l lowing , postage p r e p a i d , this°:'%j> .^day o± 
March, 1993. ^ "^~ ^ ' rf 
^.drZ' 'I AV?*0* 
Robert L. Moody 
2525 North Canyon Rd. 
Provo, UT 84604 
^t^sa-
DANA D. BURROWS 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT '™9 F£j , „ 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY >S? 
* * * * • * * * * * • * • * • * • • * * * 
HELLEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER CV 87 2408 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* * * * * * * • • * * * • • * * * • * * • 
The Court, having conducted the trial of this matter on 
February 7th, 1989 and having taken all issues under advisement, 
will rule at this time. 
The Court finds that the parties in this action are 
residents of Utah County, and the Court has jurisdiction. Each 
of the parties is granted a divorce against the other on grounds 
of irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that such grounds 
exist. The Court will not award alimony to either party. 
There was an issue raised at trial as to exactly when 
the marital relationship between the parties began. The Court 
finds, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the parties 
began to carry on a marriage like relationship on or about 
January 1, 1980, which was several years before the marriage was 
actually solemnized. 
The Court considered a number of factors in determining 
that the marital relationship began in 1980. Among these is the 
fact that the defendant stayed in the plaintiff's trailer with 
her when he was not working out of state. The defendant had the 
plaintiff's trailer moved onto a lot which he was paying for, and 
did not charge rent. The plaintiff made improvements on the 
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property such as would be expected of a married couple. The 
defendant paid debts and obligations for the plaintiff including 
substantial debts to the I.R.S. and the State Tax Commission. 
The plaintiff's child with the defendant's consent was enrolled 
in school under the name Walters. While working out of state, 
the defendant sent the plaintiff money to live on. Based on the 
foregoing circumstances, the Court finds that the parties 
established a marital relationship beginning on or about January 
1st, 1980. This is an approximate date because the Court does 
not have sufficient evidence to fix an exact date. 
Because the Court considers the parties to have begun 
their marital relationship on January 1, 1980, plaintiff is 
entitled to a share of defendant's retirement benefits accrued 
during the existence of the marriage. The formula which is to be 
used to apportion the plaintiff's share of the retirement benefit 
is found in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). 
The plaintiff will not receive any retirement benefits until the 
defendant retires. If for any reason the defendant does not 
qualify for the benefit, neither will the plaintiff. In order to 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become 
available, plaintiff's counsel must prepare an order which is to 
be filed with the defendant's employer which will give the 
instructions for payment of retirement benefits to the plaintiff. 
The formula which should be used in the order is "one half of his 
total monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator 
consists of the number of years or months they were married 
during which the defendant was employed by the federal government 
and the denominator is the total number of years or months 
defendant was in such employment." Marchant, at 206. The 
fraction cannot be determined until the defendant retires. If 
the parties wish to avoid the need to enter such an order, they 
may wish to consider a cash settlement of the retirement 
benefits. 
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The real property which is at issue was partially 
acquired before the marriage, and partially after. Considering 
when the properties were obtained, and how they were paid for, 
the Court finds the following to be an equitable division of the 
real property. The plaintiff is to receive the property in 
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is located free and clear. 
The defendant may keep the Highland property which he acquired 
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant Grove property 
subject to the $5,000.00 encumbrance which is still owing on that 
property. The Court finds that this is a fair division of the 
property which was either acquired or paid for during the 
marriage. 
The Court, having no evidence as to the amount of money 
in the Deseret Bank, or the America First accounts during or 
before the marriage, will award plaintiff half of each of those. 
Plaintiff is to receive $400.00 from the Deseret Bank Account, 
and $2750.00 of the America First account. 
The Court has no evidence of values with which to 
divide the disputed personal property of the parties. The 
parties are therefore given the option of either agreeing on a 
division of property between themselves, or having one party 
prepare two lists of property and the other selecting a list. If 
the parties have not used one of these methods to divide the 
property within 10 days, the Court orders the property sold and 
the proceeds divided. 
The Court will consider the issue of attorney's fees 
upon submission of affidavits by counsel. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, and an order 
regarding retirement benefits, if necessary, and submit them to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the 
Court for signature. 
3 
Dated this 15th day of February, 1989 
BY 
cc: Robert L. Moody, Esq. 
Thomas H. Means, Esq. 
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THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3 63 North University Avenue 
Suite 103 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
v ; 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. 
) FINDINGS OP FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) No. CV 87 2408 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 7th day of 
February, 1989. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented 
by her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means. Defendant also appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L. 
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did Plaintiff's daughter, 
Sabrina Gunderson. The parties each introduced several exhibits and 
stated their stipulations into the record. Being thereby and 
otherwise fully apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and 
filings regarding this matter, this Court, having taken the matter 
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under advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, now 
hereby enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Utah County at the time of the 
filing of her Complaint and for at least three months prior 
thereto. Defendant was a resident of Utah County at the time of the 
filing of his Counterclaim and for at least three months prior 
thereto. 
2. The parties1 marriage was solemnized on 5 October, 1984, in 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. 
3. No children have been born of this marriage and Plaintiff 
is not pregnant. Plaintiff has a minor daughter, Shirley Schantell 
Hunter (Walters) from a prior marriage, born 15 May, 1976, who 
resided with the parties during the entire period when the parties 
resided together. Plaintiff has another daughter, Sabrina 
Gunderson, now married, who resided with the parties for a short 
period when Plaintifffs mobile home was situated at 155 South 12 00 
West, Orem, Utah. 
4. During the marriage, differences have developed between the 
parties, which differences the parties have unsuccessfully 
attempted to resolve. Such differences persist. 
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5. The parties have lived separate and apart from and since on 
or about 10 November, 1987, 
6. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter 
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at 
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, continuously since in or 
about May, 1980. Plaintiff's daughter has attended the elementary 
and secondary schools servicing that address for her entire 
education and has been and is a member of the local ward of the 
church also servicing that address. Prior to May, 1980, Plaintiff 
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was 
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home 
has been the minor's only home. 
7. Defendant has been employed as a civilian employee of the 
federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial. 
8. During the parties' marriage Plaintiff has been an employee 
of United States Steel Corporation except for a period when her 
employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was the 
location where she was employed. At the time of trial, Plaintiff 
had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period of approximately 
one year. 
9. Neither party appears to be presently in need of or 
entitled to the continuing financial support of the other, either 
in the form alimony or child support. 
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10. The parties established a marriage-like relationship 
several years before their marriage was actually solemnized. 
While it is not possible to determine from the evidence the precise 
date when the parties began to cohabit, Plaintiff has established 
by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is reasonable from the 
evidence to find that such relationship commenced on or about 1 
January, 1980, and continued from and since that time through the 
time the marriage was solemnized and until the parties separated. 
From and since 1 January, 1980, the parties cohabited and 
commingled their efforts and their earnings in a manner such as 
would be expected of a married couple. The evidence which supports 
such finding is as follows: 
a. The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4 
December, 1978. 
b. At the time they met Plaintiff resided in her mobile 
home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 12 00 West, 
Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes required 
temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile 
sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when not on 
TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her mobile 
home. 
c. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own name, 
a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At that 
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same time the parties moved Plaintiff's mobile home onto that pad 
where they continued to co-habit. Defendant paid for the costs of 
moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as 
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections. 
d. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the 
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the 
realty as her residence. 
e. At various times when Defendant was on TDY 
assignments, Plaintiff helped arranged for and make physical 
improvements to the Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was 
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and 
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such improvements 
included the laying of concrete pads at each location, leveling, 
laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction of out-
buildings and a metal building. 
f. While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings 
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living 
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the 
realty. 
g. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant 
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain 
Plaintiff and her daughter. 
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h. Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's 
separate debts owed to the I.R.S., the Utah State Tax Commission, 
an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase 
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile 
accident. 
i. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor 
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and 
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended 
school under Defendant's family name of Walters. 
j. Defendant listed his address on his federal and state 
income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah - the 
same as Plaintiff's residence - for each of the years 1979, 1980, 
1981, 1982, and 1983. 
k. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in his 
federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent 
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and 
1984. 
1. The evidence does not indicate that the parties' 
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage. 
11. At the time of trial Defendant maintained an account at 
Deseret Bank with a balance in an amount of $800.00 and an account 
at America First Thrift with a balance in the amount of $5500.00. 
This Court is without evidence sufficient to establish whether 
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these balances were accumulated prior to or after the parties 
established their marital relationship. However, the balance of the 
America First Thrift account appears to have been accumulated after 
10 November, 1987, the date on or about which Defendant was served 
with a Temporary Restraining Order which is the same date when 
Defendant withdrew $3000.00 from the account. 
12. As of the date of trial Defendant was the record owner of 
four parcels of realty, to wit: 
a. Parcel 1-
62 5 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located Plaintiff's aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72 foot 
Concord. 
b. Parcel 2-
640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located a 1975 70 foot Brighton mobile home. 
c. Parcel 3-
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
d. Parcel 4-
74 6 West 600 North, Orem, Utah 
13. Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 2 
was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to 
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract for the purchase of parcel 3 in July, 1977, 
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reciting a down-payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward 
the balance of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to 
commence in June, 1978. Defendant made a final payment for parcel 3 
in the amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May, 1981. The parties have 
stipulated that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem 
parcel and that he is listed as legal owner of parcel 4 only as an 
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable 
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by 
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a 
balance as of the date of trial in the amount of approximately 
$5,000.00. 
14. Defendant testified as to the purchase prices and costs of 
improvements dedicated to parcels 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to 
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of 
trial. The parties have stipulated to this Courtfs acceptance into 
evidence of written appraisals of the parcels offered by Plaintiff 
and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a Certified Review Appraiser. 
This Court considers Mr. Lamoreaux1s assessment of the valuations 
of the parcels more credible than Defendant's own assessment for 
the following reasons: 
a. Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively 
on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to 
each parcel. 
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Mr. Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several 
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and 
shopping, existence or non-existence of public improvements, 
adverse easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout, 
insulation, adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and 
marketability, remaining economic life, availability for expansion, 
comparisons to recent sales of similar and proximate properties, 
income potential, highest and best use, and replacement cost. 
b. Defendant testified to having no significant training 
or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar properties. 
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his 
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate 
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he 
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to 
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general 
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he 
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor, 
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review 
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association. 
Upon the foregoing, this Court accepts and adopts the 
valuations placed on the properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit: 
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
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Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
Parcel 3, with improvements: $10,000.00 
15. The Court finds that because of the marriage-like 
relationship that began on 1 January, 1980, Plaintiff is entitled 
to a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the 
existence of the marriage-like relationship. The formula which is 
to be used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of the retirement 
benefit is found in Marchant v Marchant. 743 P2nd 199, (Utah App 
1987) . The Plaintiff shall not receive any retirement benefits 
until the Defendant retires. If for any reason the Defendant does 
not qualify for the benefit neither will the Plaintiff. In order to 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become 
available, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's counsel must 
prepare an order which is to be filed with the Defendant's employer 
which will give the instructions for payment of retirement benefits 
to the Plaintiff. The formula which should be used in the Order is 
"one-half of his total monthly payment times the fraction in which 
the numerator consists of the number of years or months they 
maintained the marriage-like relationship during which the 
Defendant was employed by the federal government and the 
denominator is the total number of years or months the Defendant 
was in such employment." 
10 
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16. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance 
affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and 
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their 
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for 
which either party is liable either jointly or individually. 
17. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff should be 
awarded as her sole and separate property the parties1 1980 
Chrysler automobile. 
18. The parties have stipulated that Defendant should be 
awarded as his sole and separate property the parties1 1979 
Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
19. The parties have submitted their respective written lists 
of the other personalty of their marriage and have testified as to 
their respective claims to and needs for such personalty. The 
parties have each claimed entitlement to and need for many of the 
same items of personalty. From the evidence this Court is not able 
to ascertain or assign values to the various items of personalty 
listed or claimed by the parties nor does this Court have evidence 
from which it is able to determine, by a preponderance of the 
evidence which, if any, of such personalty is separate property as 
opposed to property accumulated during the parties1 marital 
relationship. 
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20. Plaintiff has incurred an obligation in excess of $4000.00 
for attorney's fees reasonable to the prosecution of her Complaint. 
The hours expended as well as the hourly rate charged were 
reasonable in light of the complexity of the matter, the results 
obtained, and the hourly rate commonly charged for similar actions 
in this area. Plaintiff is in need of an award from Defendant to 
compensate her for a portion of said attorney's fees. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving her 
marriage to Defendant. 
2. Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving his 
marriage to Plaintiff. 
3. Neither party is entitled to an award of alimony or other 
order of lump sum or periodic financial support from the other. 
4. This Court need make no orders regarding liability for 
family or marital debts except that debt affecting the realty 
situated at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and except 
those separate debts incurred by the parties respectively after the 
date of their separation, as are addressed hereinbelow. 
5. Each party should be held solely and individually liable 
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after 
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. 
6. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing $400.00 
from Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and $2750.00 from Defendant's 
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the 
remainder of each account. 
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7• Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant 
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff. 
Defendant should retain all right, title, and interests in and to 
the parties1 realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty 
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
Such division is equitable owing to the time periods during which 
such equities were acquired in relation to the marital relationship 
that existed between the parties both prior to and after 
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective 
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties 
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the 
long established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as 
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to 
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of 
the monitory values of the properties. 
8. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable for 
all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty, 
improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0 South 50 West, 
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Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate 
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile. 
10. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate 
property the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
11. It is proper that the parties1 personalty as noted in 
their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and 
accepted as evidence by this Court, excluding the aforementioned 
automobiles and mobile homes, be marshalled, sold, and the proceeds 
therefrom divided equally between them. 
12. Plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his 
employment during the marital relationship. Such share should be 
determined according to the formula set forth in Marchant v 
Marchant, 743 P2nd 199 (Utah App. 1987) . Accordingly, Plaintiff 
should not receive her share of such benefits until Defendant 
retires. If for any reason, Defendant does not qualify for such 
benefits, neither will Plaintiff. Plaintiff's proportionate share 
should be one half (50%) of the total amount of all of Defendant's 
monthly benefit payments multiplied by the fraction in which the 
numerator is the number of months comprising the period beginning 
on 1 January, 1980, and ending on the date of trial of this matter, 
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(109 months) and the denominator is the total number of months 
Defendant is employed by the federal government. The fraction 
cannot be determined until such time as Defendant shall retire. If 
Defendant separates from civil service in advance of retirement, 
and withdraws his contributions, Plaintiff should receive a portion 
of Defendant's refund based upon the above-noted fraction. 
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of such portion of Defendant's 
civil service retirement benefits as well as a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order setting forth her rights in Defendant's civil 
service retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the 
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums 
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth 
hereinabove. 
13. It is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as and for her 
reasonable attorney's fees the sum of $1000.00. 
Dated this y day of J^gwat, 1989. 
Approved as to form: 
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THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
363 North University 
Suite 103 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
v ; 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, ] 
Defendant. ) 
AMENDED 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
> No. CV 87 2408 
This matter, having come on regularly for trial on the 7th day 
of February, 1989, and this Court, having taken the matter under 
advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, and having 
entered its written FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
her marriage to Defendant. 
2. Defendant is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
his marriage to Plaintiff. 
3. Each party is hereby held solely and individually liable 
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after 
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the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. Each party shall 
hold the other harmless for any and all such debts incurred in 
his/her individual name after 10 November, 1987. 
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing a 
$4 00.00 share of Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and a $2750.00 
share of Defendant's America First Thrift account. Defendant is 
hereby awarded the remainder of each account. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties' equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. More 
particularly described as: 
Lot 9, Plat D, Pleasant Grove Mobile Home Estates 
Defendant is hereby ordered to deed and deliver such realty to 
Plaintiff. 
6. It is hereby ordered that Defendant retain all right, 
title, and interests in and to the parties' realty and improvements 
- including the mobile home - situated at 64 0 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at 
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
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7. Defendant shall be and is hereby held solely and 
individually liable for all debt encumbering, associated with, or 
owing for the realty, improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0 
South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant shall hold Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
8. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate 
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile. 
9. Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate 
property, the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
10. It is hereby ordered that the parties1 personalty as noted 
in their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and 
accepted as evidence by this Court - but excepting the 
aforementioned automobiles and mobile homes - be marshalled, sold, 
and the proceeds therefrom divided equally between the parties. 
11. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his 
employment with the federal government during the marital 
relationship, which is and shall consist of one half (50%) of the 
total amount of all of Defendant's monthly benefit payments 
multiplied by the fraction in which the numerator is 109 and the 
denominator is the total number of months Defendant is employed by 
the federal government. The fraction shall be determined at such 
time as Defendant shall retire. Plaintiff shall not receive her 
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share of such benefits until Defendant retires. If Defendant 
separates from civil service in advance of retirement and withdraws 
his contributions, Plaintiff shall receive a portion of such refund 
based on the above-noted fraction. If for any reason, Defendant 
does not qualify for such benefits, neither will Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff is hereby granted and awarded such proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits as well as a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order setting forth her rights in 
Defendant's retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the 
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums 
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth 
hereinabove and hereby granted and awarded to her, 
12. Plaintiff is hereby granted and Defendant is hereby 
ordered to pay as and for Plaintifffs reasonable attorney's fees 
the sum of $1000.00. yn 
Dated this >J^OL day of August, 1989. 
Approved as to form: 
Fourth Judicial Distric 
Utah County 
Robert L. Moody, No. 2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2525 North Canyon Road 
P. O. Box 1466 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(801) 373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
VS. 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
I.R.S. 
State Tax Commission 
Payment on Trailer 
Payment on Car Loan 
Payment on T.V. Loan 
Wyoming Accident Bills 
Costs to move Trailer 
from Orem to Pleasant Grove 
TOTAL: 
IA 
EXPENSES PAID BY DEFENDANT 
TO ENABLE PLAINTIFF TO 
PRESERVE ASSETS 
C i v i l No. CV 87 2408 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 2 , 7 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$400 .00 
$150 .00 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$521 .00 
$ 1 0 , 3 7 1 . 0 0 
DATED t h i s Cr day of February, 1989. Z DEFENDANT'S 
f / EXHIBIT t A 
dU-1-4.0 nUDjD-rta>j^ A I N U VVULJL, 
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be 
legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out 
of a contract between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and gen-
eral reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section 
must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one 
year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage 
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be 
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
History: C. 1953, 30-1-4.5, enacted by L. ter 246, or the application of any provision to 
1987, ch. 246, § 2. any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1987, ch. remainder of the chapter is to be given effect 
246, § 5 provided that if any provision of Chap- without the invalid provision or application. 
30-1-5. Marriage solemnization — Before unauthorized 
person — Validity, 
No marriage solemnized before any person professing to have authority 
therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority, if consummated in the 
belief of the parties or either of them that he had such authority and that they 
have been lawfully married. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1187; Cross-References. — Authorized person re-
C.L. 1917, § 2970; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, quired to solemnize marriage, § 30-1-2. 
40-1-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Foreign common-law marriages. where such marriages are recognized. In re 
This section does not render valid a common- Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d 183 
law marriage entered into in a foreign state (1946). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am. Jur. 2d Marriage lack of legal authority of person solemnizing it, 
§§ 39, 106. 13 A.L.R4th 1323. 
C.J.S. — 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 29. Key Numbers. — Marriage <&=* 27. 
A.L.R. — Validity of marriage as affected by 
48-1-15. Rules determining rights and duties of partners* 
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be 
determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules: 
(1) Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of 
capital or advances to the partnership property, and share equally in the 
profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to part-
ners, are satisfied; and must contribute towards the losses, whether of 
capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to his share 
in the profits. 
(2) The partnership must indemnify every partner in respect of pay-
ments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the 
ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or for the preservation of its 
business or property. 
(3) A partner who in aid of the partnership makes any payment or 
advance beyond the amount of capital which he agreed to contribute shall 
be paid interest from the date of the payment or advance. 
(4) A partner shall receive interest on the capital contributed by him 
only from the date when repayment should be made. 
(5) All partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of 
the partnership business. 
(6) No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership 
business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable com-
pensation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs. 
(7) No person can become a member of a partnership without the con-
sent of all the partners. 
(8) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the 
partnership business may be decided by a majority of the partners; but no 
act in contravention of any agreement between the partners may be done 
rightfully without the consent of all the partners. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 18; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-15. 
ANALYSIS 
Existence of partnership. 
Gifts to members of family. 
Remuneration to partner for services. 
Repayment of contributions. 
Sharing profits and losses. 
Existence of partnership. 
An organization of workers, formed for the 
purpose of performing and undertaking con-
tracts for bricklaying jobs, did not have the es-
sential elements of either a general or limited 
partnership, where all the equipment used by 
workers belonged to one individual who had 
sole authority to make contracts for himself 
and the organization, and where workers were 
not entitled to share in profits equally or on 
any fixed percentage basis, were not charge-
able for losses, and were not permitted to de-
termine the means or methods of operating. 
Johanson Bros. Bldrs. v. Board of Review, 118 
Utah 384, 222 P.2d 563 (1950). 
Gifts to members of family. 
Where father intended at the time of dissolu-
tion of family partnership to make a gift to his 
son and wife of certain amounts of the capital 
contributions he had made to the partnership, 
and intended that such gift be accomplished by 
each partner's sharing according to respective 
partnership interests in the total assets of the 
partnership including the contributions made 
by the father, and the other partners relied on 
such gift, the agreement between the parties 
superseded Subsection (1) of this section. West 
v. West, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965). 
Remuneration to partner for services. 
Where partners had made no agreement as 
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to the partners' wages or compensation, it was 
not error for the trial court to exclude evidence 
that one partner did more work than the other, 
for partners receive no compensation for action 
in the partnership business (other than split-
ting the profits) unless there is an agreement 
or provision for such remuneration. Keller v. 
Wixom, 123 Utah 103, 255 P.2d 118 (1953). 
Generally, a partner is not entitled to any 
remuneration for his services in the absence of 
an agreement by the partners to that effect. 
Chambers v. Sims, 13 Utah 2d 371, 374 P.2d 
841 (1962). 
Where the partnership agreement or a spe-
cific practice, acquiesced in by the partners, 
contemplates the payment of salary to one or 
more partners, but no amounts are specified, it 
is presumed that payment of reasonable sala-
ries is intended. Chambers v. Sims, 13 Utah 2d 
371, 374 P.2d 841 (1962). 
While generally a partner is not entitled to 
any remuneration for his services while acting 
in the partnership business in the absence of a 
partnership agreement providing for such re-
muneration, such an agreement for remunera-
tion may be either expressed or implied. 
Knutson v. Lauer, 627 P.2d 66 (Utah 1981). 
In the absence of an agreement providing for 
remuneration, partner was not entitled to re-
muneration for services rendered while acting 
in the partnership business. Nupetco Assocs. v. 
Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877 (Utah 1983). 
Repayment of contributions. 
Upon dissolution and distribution of partner-
ship assets, this section does not authorize the 
deduction of depreciation from advances made 
for capital improvements in repayment of the 
partners' contributions, and trial court erred 
when it ordered such deduction for deprecia-
tion because the partnership agreement did 
not authorize such deduction and to allow the 
deduction would produce an unjust result. 
Knutson v. Lauer, 627 P.2d 66 (Utah 1981). 
Sharing profits and losses. 
Although obligation to share losses is not di-
rectly expressed in partnership agreement, 
generally agreement to share profits, nothing 
being said about losses, amounts prima facie to 
agreement to share losses also. Bentley v. 
Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736 (1908). 
In absence of agreement or proof of agree-
ment to contrary, partners will divide profits 
and losses equally. Kimball v. McCornick, 70 
Utah 189, 259 P. 313 (1927). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partner-
ship §§ 409 to 418, 469 to 475. 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 76. 
A.L.R. — Partner's breach of fiduciary duty 
to copartner on sale of partnership interest to 
another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122. 
Key Numbers. — Partnership @=> 70. 
48-1-16. Partnership books. 
The partnership books shall be kept, subject to any agreement between the 
partners, at the principal place of business of the partnership, and every 
partner shall at all times have access to and may inspect and copy any of 
them. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 19; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-16. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partner-
ship §§ 962 to 967. 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 91. 
Key Numbers. — Partnership <s=> 80. 
TITLE 48 
PARTNERSHIP 
Chapter 
1. General Partnership. 
2a. Utah Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. 
2b. Utah Limited Liability Company Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 
Section 
48-1-37. Rules for distribution. 
48-1-37. Rules for distribution. 
In settling accounts between the partners after dissolution the following 
rules shall be observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary: 
(1) The assets of the partnership are: 
(a) The partnership property. 
(b) The contributions of the partners necessary for the payment of 
all the liabilities specified in Subsection (2). 
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in order of payment, as 
follows: 
(a) Those owing to creditors other than partners. 
(b) Those owing to partners other than for capital and profits. 
(c) Those owing to partners in respect of capital. 
(d) Those owing to partners in respect of profits. 
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order of their declaration in Sub-
section (1) to the satisfaction of the liabilities. 
(4) The partners shall contribute as provided by Subsection 48-1-15(1) 
the amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities; but if any, but not all, of 
the partners are insolvent, or, not being subject to process, refuse to con-
tribute, the other partners shall contribute their share of the liabilities, 
and in the relative proportions in which they share the profits the addi-
tional amount necessary to pay the liabilities. 
(5) An assignee for the benefit of creditors, or any person appointed by 
the court, shall have the right to enforce the contributions specified in 
Subsection (4). 
(6) Any partner or his legal representative shall have the right to en-
force the contributions specified in Subsection (4) to the extent of the 
amount which he has paid in excess of his share of the liability. 
(7) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for the 
contributions specified in Subsection (4). 
(8) When partnership property and the individual properties of the 
partners are in the possession of a court for distribution, partnership 
creditors shall have priority on partnership property and separate credi-
tors on individual property, saving the rights of lien or secured creditors 
as heretofore. 
(9) Where a partner has become bankrupt or his estate is insolvent, the 
claims against his separate property shall rank in the following order: 
(a) Those owing to separate creditors. 
(b) Those owing to partnership creditors. 
(c) Those owing to partners by way of contribution. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 40; R.S. 1933 & ment, effective April 27, 1992, made stylistic 
C. 1943, 69-1-37; L. 1992, ch. 30, § 89. changes throughout the section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
CHAPTER 2a 
UTAH REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP ACT 
Article II 
Certificates of Limited Partnership 
Section 
48-2a-207. Liability for false statement in 
certificate. 
ARTICLE I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
48-2a-102. Name. 
(1) The name of each limited partnership as set forth in its certificate of 
limited partnership: 
(a) shall contain the words "limited partnership," "limited," "L.P.," or 
"Ltd."; 
(b) may not contain the name of a limited partner unless: 
(i) it is also the name of a general partner or the corporate name of 
a corporate general partner; or 
(ii) the business of the limited partnership had been carried on 
under that name before the admission of that limited partner; 
(c) may not contain the words "association/' "corporation/' or "incorpo-
rated/' or any abbreviation thereof, or any words or any abbreviation 
thereof which are of like import in any other language; and 
(d) may not, without the written consent of the United States Olympic 
Committee, contain the words "Olympic," "Olympiad," or "Citius Altius 
Fortius." 
(2) No person or entity other than a limited partnership formed or regis-
tered under this title may use any of the terms "limited," "limited partner-
ship," "Ltd.," or "L.P." in its name in this state except that any foreign corpo-
ration whose actual name includes the word "limited" or "Ltd." may use its 
actual name in this state if "corporation," "incorporated," or any abbreviation 
of them is also used. Notwithstanding any of the preceding provisions of Sub-
Article I 
General Provisions 
Section 
48-2a-102. Name. 
